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UNDER existing tax laws, simple compensation payable currently in cash and fully taxable can rarely be adequate to permit an 
employee, particularly at the executive level, to provide for his retire-
ment as well as for his current requirements. For the employee to 
receive advantageous treatment and for the employer to obtain and 
keep capable executives, it is usually necessary to devise other com-
pensation techniques. 
Perhaps the commonest of these techniques is the qualified pen-
sion or profit-sharing plan. Such plans have the benefit of current 
deductions for the employer with deferral of the employee's tax. 
Consequently, the possibility of using this type of plan should be 
carefully considered. 
However, qualified plans have limitations, particularly with re-
spect to the contributions that may be made on behalf of the higher-
paid employees. Additional, more flexible plans may therefore be 
desirable even though they do not qualify. 
FUNDING NON-QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
Ordinarily, any plan of deferred compensation that does not 
constitute a qualified plan should not be funded. The reason is that 
funding may result in adverse tax consequences. 
If the rights of the employee are nonforfeitable at the time pay-
ments are made into nonqualified plans, the employee is immediately 
taxable. Thus, he not only receives no tax advantage but will be 
confronted with the necessity of raising the funds to pay taxes on 
money that he has not received. 
If the employee's rights are forfeitable when the employer's pay-
ments are made, the employee will generally not be taxed until he 
receives benefits. In this case, the principal adverse tax consequences 
pertain to the employer. The employer will not be entitled to any 
deduction at the time of contribution where the employee's rights 
are forfeitable at that time. It is the Treasury position that no deduc-
tion can be claimed in a subsequent year when payments are made 
to the employee. The basis of this position is that there is no accrual 
in a subsequent year. 
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This Treasury position is not supported by the Court of Claims, 
which holds that the employer is entitled to a deduction when amounts 
are paid to the employee (Russell, 175 F. Supp. 159). The Treasury 
is unwilling to follow this rule. Consequently the employer's deduc-
tion is, at best, deferred and can be obtained at any time only by 
litigation, if at all. 
Although funding a nonqualified plan has the adverse conse-
quences just discussed, the employee may still desire some security 
beyond the general credit of the employer, particularly if the em-
ployer is other than the strongest possible corporation. There has 
been some litigation over the question of whether specific invest-
ments by the employer, such as in an insurance policy providing for 
payments corresponding to the employee's rights, would constitute 
funding, particularly in a closely held corporation. It now appears 
reasonably clear that such investments do not constitute funding, 
provided they constitute general investments of the employer and 
the employee has no special rights or preferred position with respect 
to them. Whether such investments increase the employee's security 
would be a matter to be considered in each situation. 
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS 
In view of these considerations, the usually preferred form of 
deferred compensation plan is an unfunded contractual arrangement 
whereby the employer agrees to make payments to the employee 
extending into the period of his retirement, at which time the em-
ployee's tax bracket will presumably be more favorable. A question 
to which considerable thought has been given in this type of plan 
is whether the employee's tax can possibly be accelerated by the 
Treasury under some theory of cash equivalent or constructive re-
ceipt. 
Generally, the courts have refused to tax the unsecured promise 
of an employer as equivalent to cash regardless of its financial stand-
ing. 
In one case (Wolfe, 8 TC 689) taxpayer had been employed by 
subsidiaries of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. One of these 
subsidiaries made a payment to Standard, and Standard agreed in 
writing to pay and did pay the employee certain amounts each year 
upon his retirement. The employee was taxable only as amounts 
were actually received. Because of the relationships between the 
companies, this was held to be merely an arrangement to pay a pen-
sion rather than an annuity contract. Cases concerning ordinary 
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commercial annuity contracts purchased by employers from insurance 
companies for employees were distinguished. In spite of the pay-
ment made, the agreement to carry out the pension policy in this 
case was not considered to have such value as to be taxable to the 
employee until he actually received payments. 
The Internal Revenue Service has published a somewhat detailed 
discussion of the problem and its position (Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 
CB 174). A mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or security 
in any way, is not regarded as a receipt of income under the cash-
receipts-and-disbursements method. Although under the doctrine 
of constructive receipt a taxpayer may not deliberately turn his back 
on income and thereby select the year for which he will report it, 
the statute cannot be administered by speculating whether the payor 
would have been willing to agree to an earlier payment. The deter-
mination in each case must be made on the basis of the specific facts 
as they exist. 
In one Internal Revenue Service example certain amounts were 
credited to a reserve each year that the taxpayer worked, pursuant 
to a contract. Payout of the reserve was to begin upon termination 
of employment or the commencement of disability. The amount in 
the reserve was to be paid out over a five-year period. In the event 
of the failure of the employee to perform his duties no further credits 
would be made to the reserve, but the employee would have a right 
to receive the amounts previously credited. There was no provision 
for forfeiture of the employee's rights to distribution from the 
reserve, and in the event of his death his personal representative 
would receive the remaining amounts. Under these circumstances 
the Internal Revenue Service held that the employee would be taxed 
only as payments were received. 
A similar result was reached where the reserve accounts were 
credited with amounts in relation to the employer's profits and also 
with net amounts realized from investing any portion of the amount 
in the account. In this case there were provisions requiring the em-
ployee to refrain from engaging in any business competitive with 
that of the employer and requiring him to be available for consulta-
tion. 
A third example dealt with an agreement between an author 
and a publisher. The publisher agreed to pay specified royalties 
based on the actual cash received from the sale of the published 
work. At the same time another agreement between the parties 
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provided that no more than a certain amount should be paid in any 
one calendar year. Any excess of the amounts accruing over the 
maximum payment would be carried over into succeeding accounting 
periods. The author was required to include amounts in income only 
as actually received. The essential point here appears to have been 
that the agreement limiting the payments in any one year was entered 
into before the royalties were earned. Presumably an agreement 
entered into after royalties were earned would constitute the author's 
turning his back on income. 
In a fourth example the employee entered into a contract where-
by he was to be paid part of the consideration over a five-year 
period. However, the employer was required to and did place the full 
amount in escrow with a bank. The amount in question was held 
income to the employee when the payment was made to the escrow 
agent. 
In the final example discussed in this ruling a boxer entered 
into an agreement with a boxing club whereby he was to receive a 
certain percentage of the gate, payable however over a period of 
three years. In this case the boxer was considered to have entered 
into a joint venture and was not an employee. His share of the gross 
receipts was considered to have belonged to him right from the 
beginning and was immediately taxable to him. 
The Internal Revenue Service is also understood to consider 
that any pledge or deposit of collateral is equivalent to a trust or 
escrow arrangement and results in taxability to the employee at the 
time of deposit. This view appears doubtful in the light of several 
cases holding that the deposit of collateral does not constitute pay-
ment. In one Supreme Court case (Price, 309 U.S. 409) it was stated: 
"Respondent urges that his note was secured, but the collateral was 
not payment. It was given to secure respondent's promise to pay and 
if that promise to pay was not sufficient to warrant the deduction 
until the promise was made good by actual payment, the giving of 
security for performance did not transform the promise into the pay-
ment required." 
In view of the Internal Revenue Service position, however, it is 
probably safest to omit any direct security for the employer's promise. 
CONDITIONS ON LIABILITY 
It has usually been considered to be the part of wisdom to include 
conditions in any deferred compensation agreements of the type here 
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being considered. The commonest conditions are agreement not to 
compete after retirement and agreement that the employee continue 
to make himself available for consultation. One of the examples in 
the ruling previously discussed indicates that the deferred compen-
sation result can be achieved even in the absence of conditions of 
this kind. However, each case stands on its own facts and the Internal 
Revenue Service normally declines to issue advance rulings on spe-
cific deferred compensation cases. 
Therefore, it appears that including this type of condition in 
deferred compensation agreements may still be advantageous. How-
ever, where continued consultation is made available, a question does 
arise concerning the recipient's social security benefits. 
EFFECT ON "SEPARATION FROM T H E SERVICE" 
Perhaps a more serious consideration in many cases is the effect 
on capital gains treatment of lump-sum distributions from a qualified 
employee trust. Generally, if the total distributions payable to any 
employee are paid to him within one taxable year, on account of his 
death "or other separation from the service," he is entitled to capital 
gains treatment on the distribution. If the individual is required to 
render advisory service under a deferred compensation arrangement 
a question arises about whether he may be said to have been separated 
from the employer's service. 
In one case (Fry, 19 TC 461) the individual spent a certain 
amount of time after his retirement training new employees for the 
type of work that he had been doing. He nevertheless continued to 
draw his regular salary. He was held not entitled to capital gains 
treatment on the basis that he had not severed his connection with 
his employer. 
The Internal Revenue Service has ruled (Rev. Rul. 57-115, 1957-1 
CB 160) adversely in the case of an individual who continued to act in 
the capacity of an officer and director. "Rendition of services or being 
employed to render services and not the element of compensation is 
the determinative factor in seeking to establish whether or not there 
has been a separation from the service." (See also Bolden, 39 TC No. 
85). It may be noted that this ruling refers to services both as an 
officer and as a director. The result might be different if the individual 
served only as a director. Generally, service as a director does not 
constitute service as an employee. However, the Code (section 402(a) 
(2)) refers to "separation from the service." Presumably, this refers to 
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service as an employee and the Internal Revenue Service is under-
stood so to hold, although it might be argued that a director con-
tinues in the company's service even though not as an employee. A 
recent ruling (Rev. Rul. 63-22, 1963-8 IRB 14) allows capital gains 
treatment where the individual was subsequently elected by the share-
holders to serve as liquidator of the corporation. 
It would therefore seem that the consultation provision in a de-
ferred compensation agreement, if it has any substance, would proba-
bly destroy the employee's right to capital gains treatment on a lump-
sum distribution from a qualified trust. In a recent case (Bolden, 
supra) the individual was denied capital gains treatment where he had 
agreed to stay in the company's employ in an advisory and consulting 
capacity. Apparently his actual services were somewhat nominal. 
"The mere fact that the company did not demand the hours of service 
contracted for or call upon him more often for advice does not prove 
that the petitioner was not employed . . . nor does it deprive the pay-
ment of its compensatory nature. It was similar to a retainer fee." 
STOCK OPTION PLANS 
Another compensation technique that is very popular is the 
stock option plan. In the case of listed or actively traded corporations 
the restricted stock option plan has been very frequently adopted. 
Under such plans the corporation receives no deduction but the em-
ployee may obtain all, or substantially all, of his gain at capital gains 
rates. 
For various reasons, the restricted stock option is less attractive 
to the closely held corporation. One of the principal problems is the 
difficulty in establishing the fair market value of the stock. In order 
to qualify as a restricted stock option plan the option price must be at 
least 85 per cent of the fair market value of the stock at the time the 
option is granted. If there is no reasonably sure way of determining 
the fair market value of the stock, there can be no reasonable cer-
tainty that any given plan will qualify. The Internal Revenue Service 
declines to accept a plan where the price is subject to adjustment to 
conform with the results of a tax examination. Even if the Internal 
Revenue Service were willing to accept such a formula, there would 
be a serious question concerning the desirability of such a plan to the 
employee, for he would be obligating himself to buy stock at a price 
that might be subject to considerable adjustment at a later date. The 
Revenue Bill of 1963 may ameliorate this problem by providing a 
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penalty rather than complete disqualification if the option price is too 
low. On the other hand, it may create additional problems by raising 
the qualifying percentage of market. 
Perhaps more suited to the problems of many corporations is the 
unrestricted stock option. Under such a plan, the corporation obtains 
a deduction for the compensation element and the employee pays a 
tax thereon. The question in this type of plan, however, is: When does 
compensation occur and how is it measured? 
Before the Smith (325 U.S. 177) and LoBue (351 U.S. 243) cases, 
it was often argued that there was no element of compensation in a 
situation where there was no spread between the option price and 
stock value at the time the option was issued. However, it now ap-
pears that if there was no market value at the grant date of an option, 
it will be inferred that there was an intent to give compensation at 
some later time "after the anticipated advance in the market price of 
the stock." (Smith.) 
It is recognized that the recipient of a stock option might, under 
other circumstances, realize an immediate taxable gain where the op-
tion would have a readily ascertainable market value and the recipient 
would be free to sell his option. 
This principle is recognized in the Regulations (section 1.421-6). 
But, the Regulations state that "value is ordinarily not readily as-
certainable unless the option is actively traded on an established 
market." "The fair market value of an option is not merely the 
difference which may exist at a particular time between the option 
price and the value of the property subject to the option, but also in-
cludes the value of the option privilege. Accordingly, the fair market 
value of the option is not readily ascertainable unless the value of the 
option privilege can be measured with reasonable accuracy." 
However, in a recent case (Colton, 209 F. Supp. 381) it was 
pointed out that it "would seem implicit in the cases that the deter-
mination of the value of the option depends upon whether the option 
price exceeds the market price or not." The case nevertheless found 
a value for the option greater than the difference between the market 
price of the stock and the option price, which additional amount 
represented the value of the option privilege. The taxpayer had con-
tended for this larger value in partial support of his contention that 
the option did in fact have a value at the time it was granted. There-
fore, the case did not specifically sustain the Regulation provision. 
An important and perhaps controlling element under the cases is 
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whether the employer and the employee intended that the option 
itself be the compensation, or whether they intended the subsequent 
appreciation in the stock to be the element of compensation. If the 
employer deducts the value of the option and the employee includes 
it in income, this will be evidence of their intention that the option 
should represent the compensation (McNamara, 210 F. (2d) 505). 
However, failure to treat the grant of the option in this manner is only 
evidentiary and not conclusive (Colton, supra). 
With respect to the Regulation requirement that the value of the 
option is ordinarily not readily ascertainable unless the option is 
actively traded, the recent case previously referred to accepted the 
testimony of an experienced stock broker. This approach would 
appear reasonable. It would also appear that the value of the option 
is a question of fact, and the intent of the parties to make the option 
the compensation should not be destroyed because their valuation of 
it is inexact, and perhaps changed on examination. 
Nevertheless, in view of the Regulation provision in this matter, 
it would appear that controversy is almost sure to result from an 
attempt to treat the granting of the option itself, rather than its 
exercise, as compensation unless there is active trading in the option. 
Where the option does not have a readily ascertainable fair 
market value at the time of grant, the Regulation provides generally 
that the employee realizes compensation at the time he exercises the 
option, provided the stock received is not subject to any restrictions 
that have a substantial effect on its market value. In the absence of 
such restrictions, the amount of compensation is the difference be-
tween the fair market value of the stock and the option price at the 
time option is exercised. 
Where there are substantial restrictions that affect value at the 
time of exercise, compensation is not realized until the restrictions 
are removed (or the property is sold, if that occurs before the restric-
tions are removed). The amount of compensation realized is the lesser 
of the amounts computed by taking a measurement: first, at the date 
of exercise of the option; and second, at the date the restrictions are 
removed (or the stock is sold). 
The measure at the date the option is exercised is the difference 
between the fair value of the stock without regard to restrictions and 
the option price. The measure at the date the restrictions are removed 
is the difference between the fair market value at that time and the 
option price. 
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In a closely held corporation perhaps the principal use of the 
option is to obtain managerial ability from one or more individuals 
who are not part of the control group. In such companies, the con-
trol group is often unwilling to have the stock remain with the execu-
tive after he leaves the company's employ or have it get into the hands 
of the public under any circumstances. For these reasons, there is 
frequently a provision that the optionee must sell or at least offer 
his stock to the corporation or other stockholders in the event that 
he leaves the company's employ or before he sells the stock to any 
outsiders. 
If the requirement is merely that the employee offer to sell the 
stock to his employer at its fair market value at the time of sale, that 
restriction is not considered to affect fair market value in a signifi-
cant way. Under these circumstances the employee realizes compen-
sation at the time he exercises his option. 
If, however, the employee is required to sell the stock back at 
book value, this condition does constitute a significant restriction. 
Compensation, therefore, is realized only at the time the restriction is 
removed or the stock is actually sold. 
This latter provision—that the employee will sell his stock back 
at book value—can work to reasonable advantage. The employee can 
be given his stock at any price without the realization of any compen-
sation at the time he exercises his option. If the stock is dividend-
paying, he can, of course, begin to participate in these distributions. 
He will also benefit by any increases in book value—presumably owing 
in part, at least, to his efforts. It is true that the difference between 
the option price and the amount at which he sells the stock back will 
ultimately be taxed to him at ordinary rates. However, the employer 
is entitled to a corresponding deduction at the same time which may 
soften the over-all tax blow considerably, if not entirely, depending on 
the respective brackets of the employer-corporation and the employee. 
Under the averaging provisions of the Revenue Bill of 1963 the 
effect of a possible substantial inclusion in income in one year would 
tend to be mitigated. Alternatively, the sell-back could take place 
over a period of years. 
FRINGE BENEFITS 
In addition to some of the basic compensation techniques previ-
ously discussed, there are various fringe benefits that may be pro-
vided tax-free to the employees. Among the most important of these 
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fringe benefits are certain kinds of insurance protection, including 
accident and health. 
One of the major insurance benefits available is pointed out and 
may be somewhat modified by the Revenue Bill of 1963. This benefit 
relates to group term life insurance. Under the Regulations (section 
1.61-2(d) (2)) it is stated that "premiums paid by an employer on 
policies of group term life insurance covering the lives of his employees 
are not gross income to the employees even if they designate the bene-
ficiaries." Under the provisions of the 1963 Revenue Bill the employee 
will no longer be tax exempt to the extent that the insurance coverage 
provided is in excess of $30,000. However, insurance coverage up to 
$30,000 under group term policies will continue to be exempt. 
CONCLUSION 
The problems of getting and keeping capable management per-
sonnel continue to be acute. Methods by which compensation can 
be given that is not immediately passed to the taxing authority with 
the employee acting as a mere conduit will therefore continue to be of 
great importance to the business community. 
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